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PRIVATE-VALUE AUCTION VERSUS POSTED-PRICE SELLING: AN AGENT-BASED MODEL APPROACH

机译:私有价值拍卖与定价销售:基于代理的模型方法

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摘要

An agent-based first-price private-value auction and an agent-based posted-price market are developed to compare these selling methods when buyers have private values. If the seller cannot impose a reserve price and has little uncertainty about the item's value, the seller's expected revenue is highest in the posted-price market. Otherwise, the seller is better off selling the item with the auction. Using a genetic algorithm and Monte Carlo integration solved the agent-based models quicker and provided more precise answers than solving models with particle swarm optimization and using the trapezoidal rule for numerical integration.
机译:开发了基于代理人的第一价格私有价值拍卖和基于代理人的价格公开市场,以在购买者具有私有价值时比较这些销售方法。如果卖方不能强加底价,并且对物品的价值几乎没有不确定性,则卖方的预期收入在标价市场中最高。否则,卖方最好通过拍卖出售该物品。与使用粒子群优化和使用梯形规则进行数值积分求解相比,使用遗传算法和蒙特卡洛积分可以更快地求解基于代理的模型,并提供更精确的答案。

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