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Government financial intervention in green and regular supply chains: Multi-level game theory approach

机译：政府对绿色和常规供应链的干预：多层次博弈论方法

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摘要

In this paper, we consider the effect of a government's environmental protection policies on green and regular supply chains. The proposed model is founded upon a three-level distributed programming problem where the government as a Stackelberg leader determines subsidy and tax strategies for green and regular supply chains, respectively. By choosing the appropriate subsidy and tax, the government aims to decrease the negative effects of a regular supply chain on the environment and to encourage green production. Each supply chain as a Stackelberg follower consists of one seller and one buyer. The nonlinear bi-level programming problem is first transformed into a single-level programming one by Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions, then it is solved by a branch-and-bound method. At the end, we present a numerical example to investigate how the budgetary constraints of the government affect the efficiency of its decisions to reduce the pollution of the products.
机译：在本文中，我们考虑了政府的环保政策对绿色和常规供应链的影响。提议的模型基于三级分布式编程问题，在该问题中，作为Stackelberg领导人的政府分别确定了绿色和常规供应链的补贴和税收策略。通过选择适当的补贴和税收，政府旨在减少常规供应链对环境的负面影响，并鼓励绿色生产。作为Stackelberg追随者的每个供应链都由一个卖方和一个买方组成。非线性双层规划问题首先通过Karush-Kuhn-Tucker条件转化为单层规划，然后通过分支定界法求解。最后，我们提供了一个数字示例来研究政府的预算约束如何影响其减少产品污染的决策效率。

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