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首页> 外文期刊>International journal of production economics >A partial credit guarantee contract in a capital-constrained supply chain: Financing equilibrium and coordinating strategy
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A partial credit guarantee contract in a capital-constrained supply chain: Financing equilibrium and coordinating strategy

机译：资金受限的供应链中的部分信用担保合同：融资均衡和协调策略

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摘要

In this study, we first design a supply chain finance (SCF) system comprising a capital-constrained retailer, a manufacturer, and a commercial bank, and formulate a bilevel Stackelberg game model in which the bank acts as a leader. Second, we design a partial credit guarantee (PCG) contract for SCF, incorporating the bank credit financing (BCF) and manufacturer's trade credit guarantee, to analyze its equilibrium financing strategies. Third, we explore the interdependencies between the operational and financial decisions and analyze the coordination conditions for the PCG contract. Fourth, we perform a comparative analysis of the optimal strategies among the various financing scenarios, including a traditional supply chain without capital constraint and SCF without credit guarantee as well as one with full credit guarantee, to examine the impact of the credit guarantee coefficient. Finally, we perform a numerical sensitivity analysis in terms of the manufacturer's guarantee coefficient and the retailer's initial capital, and verify the manufacturer's willingness to provide PCG for SCF. The findings of this study reveal that based on a suitable guarantee coefficient, the PCG contract may realize profit maximization and channel coordination in the SCF system as well as achieve the super-coordination effect. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机译：在本研究中，我们首先设计一个由资金受限的零售商，制造商和商业银行组成的供应链金融（SCF）系统，并制定一个由银行充当领导者的双层Stackelberg博弈模型。其次，我们设计了SCF的部分信用担保（PCG）合同，结合了银行信用融资（BCF）和制造商的贸易信用担保，以分析其均衡融资策略。第三，我们探讨了运营和财务决策之间的相互依存关系，并分析了PCG合同的协调条件。第四，我们对各种融资方案中的最优策略进行了比较分析，包括没有资本约束的传统供应链和没有信用担保的SCF以及具有完全信用担保的SCF，以检查信用担保系数的影响。最后，我们根据制造商的担保系数和零售商的初始资金进行了数值敏感性分析，并验证了制造商为SCF提供PCG的意愿。研究结果表明，基于适当的担保系数，PCG合同可以在SCF系统中实现利润最大化和渠道协调，并达到超协调效果。 （C）2015 Elsevier B.V.保留所有权利。

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