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首页> 外文期刊>International journal of production economics >Quality control game model in logistics service supply chain based on different combinations of risk attitude
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Quality control game model in logistics service supply chain based on different combinations of risk attitude

机译：基于风险态度不同组合的物流服务供应链质量控制博弈模型

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摘要

The existing quality control studies of supply chain mostly only consider one member's risk attitude, and ignore the combination of two members' risk attitudes. Therefore, a discussion about different risk attitudes affect quality control game of supply chain especially in logistics service supply chain (LSSC) is required. A basic quality control game model (Model Ⅰ) was established in a LSSC composed of a logistics service integrator (LSI) and a functional logistics service provider (FLSP). In this model, LSI can choose to provide quality supervision or not, and FLSP can choose to accomplish a task according to the quality contract or cheat. The mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of Model I was presented. A new model (Model Ⅱ) with different combinations of risk attitudes was then built based on Model I, and the new mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium was provided. The influences of various combinations of risk attitudes on LSI's supervision probability and FLSP's compliance probability were also discussed. Results show that the level of risk attitude of LSI and FLSP should not be unlimited, and an interval is existed respectively. LSI prefers risk-seeking FLSP in order to obtain smaller supervision possibility and larger compliance possibility.
机译：现有的供应链质量控制研究大多只考虑一个成员的风险态度，而忽略了两个成员的风险态度的结合。因此，需要讨论不同的风险态度会影响供应链的质量控制博弈，尤其是在物流服务供应链（LSSC）中。在由物流服务集成商（LSI）和功能性物流服务提供商（FLSP）组成的LSSC中建立了基本的质量控制博弈模型（ModelⅠ）。在此模型中，LSI可以选择是否提供质量监督，而FLSP可以根据质量合同或作弊选择完成一项任务。提出了模型I的混合策略纳什均衡。在模型I的基础上，建立了具有不同风险态度组合的模型（模型Ⅱ），并提出了新的混合策略纳什均衡模型。还讨论了风险态度的各种组合对LSI监管概率和FLSP遵从概率的影响。结果表明，LSI和FLSP的风险态度水平不应该是无限的，并且存在一定的间隔。 LSI倾向于寻求风险的FLSP，以便获得较小的监管可能性和较大的合规可能性。

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