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首页> 外文期刊>International journal of production economics >Channel coordination and profit distribution in a social responsible three-layer supply chain
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Channel coordination and profit distribution in a social responsible three-layer supply chain

机译：具有社会责任感的三层供应链中的渠道协调和利润分配

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摘要

This paper analyzes coordination of a manufacturer-distributer-retailer supply chain, where the manufacturer exhibits corporate social responsibility (CSR). In manufacturer-Stackelberg game setting, the paper proposes a contract-bargaining process to resolve channel conflict and to distribute surplus profit among the channel members. The contract-bargaining process consists of two wholesale price discount-Nash bargaining. One between the distributer and the retailer based on the outcome of that between the distributer and the manufacturer. Although the contract-bargaining process cuts out channel conflict and distributes surplus profit, the wholesale prices are quite different from those of a pure profit maximizing supply chain. The wholesale price of the manufacturer is less than its marginal production cost above a threshold of CSR. Even it is negative for the manufacturer's heavy CSR practice. So, the manufacturer's profit may be negative. The behavior of the wholesale price of the distributer is same as that of the manufacturer but for higher threshold of CSR. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机译：本文分析了制造商-分销商-零售商供应链的协调，制造商在其中表现出企业社会责任（CSR）。在制造商-Stackelberg游戏环境中，本文提出了一种合同谈判过程，以解决渠道冲突并在渠道成员之间分配剩余利润。合同讨价还价过程包括两次批发价格折扣－纳什讨价还价。基于分销商与制造商之间的结果，在分销商与零售商之间建立一个关系。尽管合同谈判过程消除了渠道冲突并分配了剩余利润，但批发价格与纯利润最大化供应链的批发价格却大不相同。制造商的批发价低于其边际生产成本（高于企业社会责任的门槛）。甚至对制造商严格的CSR实践也是不利的。因此，制造商的利润可能为负。批发商的批发价格行为与制造商的行为相同，但企业社会责任的门槛较高。 （C）2015 Elsevier B.V.保留所有权利。

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