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首页> 外文期刊>International Journal of Production Research >Optimal pricing and trade-in policies in a dual-channel supply chain when considering market segmentation
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Optimal pricing and trade-in policies in a dual-channel supply chain when considering market segmentation

机译：考虑市场细分时双通道供应链中的最佳定价和贸易策略

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摘要

Many companies are implementing trade-in programmes through multiple channels. This may ultimately lead to fiercer channel conflict and competition. Few studies have explored firms' optimal trade-in policies in such an environment. To fill the gap, we build a theoretical model that captures the features of a dual-channel situation in which a manufacturer implements a trade-in programme through retail and direct channels simultaneously. Compared with the case in which there is no trade-in rebate, the results show that a trade-in programme can intensify or mitigate the double marginalisation effect if the retailer can initially decide the trade-in rebate in the retail channel. This significantly relies on market segmentation. However, when the retailer cannot decide the trade-in rebate in the retail channel, the trade-in programme aggravates the double marginalisation effect. Second, the trade-in rebate offered by the retailer may be higher than the subsidy offered by the manufacturer, as long as the retailer can autonomously decide the trade-in rebate in the retail channel. Furthermore, we find that both the manufacturer and retailer prefer to obtain the right to autonomously decide the trade-in rebate in the retail channel, but the supply chain prefers that the manufacturer do it. Some numerical examples are provided to further explain these outcomes.
机译：许多公司正在通过多渠道实施贸易计划。这可能最终导致频道的渠道冲突和竞争。很少有研究在这种环境中探索了公司的最佳贸易政策。为了填补差距，我们构建一个理论模型，捕获了双通道情况的特征，其中制造商通过零售和直接渠道同时实现贸易程序。与没有贸易回扣的情况相比，结果表明，如果零售商最初可以在零售渠道中的贸易中决定贸易转换，则可以加剧或减轻双边缘化效果的贸易计划。这显着依赖于市场细分。但是，当零售商无法在零售渠道中决定贸易折扣时，贸易署计划加剧了双边缘化效应。其次，零售商提供的贸易折扣可能高于制造商提供的补贴，只要零售商可以自主决定零售渠道的贸易回扣。此外，我们发现制造商和零售商都更愿意获得自主决定零售渠道的贸易回扣的权利，但供应链更喜欢制造商做到这一点。提供了一些数值示例以进一步解释这些结果。

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