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首页> 外文期刊>International journal of sustainable transportation >Pareto-improving social optimal pricing schemes based on bottleneck permits for managing congestion at a merging section
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Pareto-improving social optimal pricing schemes based on bottleneck permits for managing congestion at a merging section

机译：基于瓶颈许可的帕累托改进的社会最优定价方案，用于在合并部分管理拥堵

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Akamatsu, Sato, and Nguyen (2006) proposed a first-best pricing scheme based on the concept of bottleneck permits. The scheme allows permit holders to pass a bottleneck at specified times and is shown to be able to minimize social cost. However, the scheme is not always Pareto-improving in that it may harm some drivers. The objective of this study is to design Pareto-improving pricing scheme with bottleneck permits for a V-shaped two-to-one merge bottleneck. First, the paper formulates the morning commute model in the network and describes the arrival time choice equilibrium in the network with merging bottleneck. Secondly, we show that the first-best pricing scheme with bottleneck permits for this V-shaped network does not always achieve a Pareto improvement, with the cost of one group of drivers is increased by the permit pricing, a phenomena akin to the bottleneck paradox of Arnott, de Palma, and Lindsey (1993). We propose three implementations of bottleneck permits for Pareto-improving: (1) merging priority rule is included in the bottleneck permits scheme by creating different market for each origin; (2) the permit revenues are refunded as monetary compensation to drivers whose cost is increased; and (3) the permit revenues are used to expand bottleneck capacity. For each implementation, we derive their equilibrium solutions and demonstrate that the Pareto improvement is achieved and social cost is decreased by using the permit revenues for expanding the bottleneck capacity.
机译：Akamatsu，Sato和Nguyen（2006）根据瓶颈许可的概念提出了一种最佳的定价方案。该方案允许许可证持有人在规定的时间通过瓶颈，并被证明能够最大程度地降低社会成本。但是，该方案并不总是帕累托改进的，因为它可能会损害某些驾驶员。这项研究的目的是设计具有V形两对一合并瓶颈的瓶颈许可的帕累托改进定价方案。首先，本文提出了网络中的早晨通勤模型，并描述了具有合并瓶颈的网络中的到达时间选择平衡。其次，我们表明，对于这种V形网络，具有瓶颈许可的最佳定价方案并不总是能够实现帕累托改进，因为许可证定价会增加一组驾驶员的成本，这类似于瓶颈悖论Arnott，de Palma和Lindsey（1993）。我们提出了三种实现帕累托改进的瓶颈许可的实施方案：（1）通过为每个来源创建不同的市场，将优先权规则合并到瓶颈许可方案中； （2）将许可收入作为货币补偿退还给成本增加的驾驶员； （3）许可证收入用于扩大瓶颈容量。对于每个实现，我们导出其均衡解，并证明通过使用许可收入扩展瓶颈容量可以实现帕累托改进，社会成本降低。

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