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The relation between earnings-based measures in firm debt contracts and CEO pay sensitivity to earnings

机译：公司债务合同中基于收益的度量与首席执行官对收益的敏感性之间的关系

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摘要

I investigate how implicit incentives provided by earnings-based debt covenants affect the structure of CEO compensation contracts. This provides a new and unique view of how the CEO's incentives are shaped by not only his compensation contract but also debt contracts. I find when debt contracts contain an earnings-based covenant, the CEO's pay sensitivity to earnings is muted. Additionally, I find some evidence that pay sensitivity to earnings varies with earnings-based covenant slack. This study provides evidence consistent with shareholders rebalancing the CEO's earnings incentives in the presence of earnings-based covenants, thereby tilting incentives away from earnings performance. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机译：我研究了基于收益的债务契约所提供的隐性激励如何影响首席执行官薪酬合同的结构。这为首席执行官的激励机制如何不仅受到其薪酬合同而且还受到债务合同的影响提供了一种新颖而独特的观点。我发现，当债务合同包含基于收益的契约时，CEO对收入的薪酬敏感性就会减弱。此外，我发现一些证据表明，工资对收入的敏感性会随基于收入的契约松弛而变化。这项研究提供了与股东在存在基于收益的契约的情况下重新平衡首席执行官的收益激励措施相一致的证据，从而使激励措施偏离了收益表现。 （C）2015 Elsevier B.V.保留所有权利。

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