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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of accounting, auditing & finance >Has the Regulation of Non-GAAP Disclosures Influenced Managers' Use of Aggressive Earnings Exclusions?
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Has the Regulation of Non-GAAP Disclosures Influenced Managers' Use of Aggressive Earnings Exclusions?

机译：非GAAP披露规定是否影响经理人使用激进收入排除法？

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The frequency of non-GAAP (or "pro forma") reporting has continued to increase in the United States over the last decade, despite preliminary evidence that regulatory intervention led to a decline in non-GAAP disclosures. In particular, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) and Regulation G (2003) impose strict requirements related to the reporting of non-GAAP numbers. More recently, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has renewed its emphasis on non-GAAP reporting and declared it a "fraud risk factor." Given the SEC's renewed emphasis on non-GAAP disclosures, we explore the extent to which regulation has curbed potentially misleading disclosures by investigating two measures of aggressive non-GAAP reporting. Consistent with the intent of Congress and the SEC, we find some evidence that managers report adjusted earnings metrics more cautiously in the post-SOX regulatory environment. Specifically, the results suggest that firms reporting non-GAAP earnings in the post-SOX period are less likely to (a) exclude recurring items incremental to those excluded by analysts and (b) use non-GAAP exclusions to meet strategic earnings targets on a non-GAAP basis that they miss based on Institutional Brokers' Estimate System (l/B/E/S) actual earnings. However, we also find that some firms exclude specific recurring items aggressively. Overall, the results suggest that while regulation has generally reduced aggressive non-GAAP reporting, some firms continue to disclose non-GAAP earnings numbers that could be misleading in the post-SOX regulatory environment.
机译：尽管有初步证据表明监管干预导致了非GAAP披露的减少，但在过去十年中，非GAAP（或“备考”）报告的频率在美国持续增加。特别是2002年的《萨班斯-奥克斯利法案》（SOX）和G法规（2003年）对报告非GAAP编号提出了严格的要求。最近，美国证券交易委员会（SEC）重新强调了非公认会计准则报告，并宣布其为“欺诈风险因素”。鉴于SEC重新强调非GAAP披露，我们将通过调查积极的非GAAP报告的两种措施来探索监管在多大程度上抑制了可能误导性的披露。与国会和SEC的意图一致，我们发现一些证据表明管理人员在SOX后监管环境中更加谨慎地报告调整后的收益指标。具体而言，结果表明，在SOX后时期内报告非GAAP收益的公司不太可能（a）排除与分析人员排除的项目相比递增的经常性项目，以及（b）使用非GAAP排除项来满足a根据机构经纪人的估算系统（l / B / E / S）实际收入，他们错过的非公认会计准则基础。但是，我们还发现一些公司积极地排除了特定的经常性项目。总体而言，结果表明，尽管监管通常减少了积极的非GAAP报告，但一些公司仍在继续披露可能会误导SOX后监管环境的非GAAP收益数字。

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