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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of accounting and public policy >Discontinuities in earnings and earnings change distributions after J-SOX implementation: Empirical evidence from Japan
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Discontinuities in earnings and earnings change distributions after J-SOX implementation: Empirical evidence from Japan

机译：实施J-SOX后收益的不连续性和收益变化分布：来自日本的经验证据

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Prior research finds that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (US-SOX) of 2002 has affected earnings management in the United States. Cohen et al. (2008) indicate that accrual-based earnings management has declined since the passage of US-SOX, while real earnings management has increased. Further, Gilliam et al. (2015) show that the zero-earnings discontinuity has disappeared since its passage, indicating that earnings management to avoid losses has decreased as a result. In Japan, the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act of 2006, the so-called Japanese version of SOX (J-SOX), was implemented for fiscal years starting in April 2008. Similar to US-SOX, J-SOX aims to reinforce the corporate governance of financial reporting. This study investigates whether the discontinuity in the distributions of earnings and earnings changes disappeared after J-SOX implementation. In contrast to US-SOX, the results indicate that the discontinuity in the earnings distribution at zero did not disappear after J-SOX implementation. However, the discontinuity in the earnings change distribution at zero almost disappeared after J-SOX implementation, indicating that earnings management to avoid earnings decreases became less prevalent. In addition, the results indicate that the discontinuity in the distribution of earnings changes before J-SOX implementation was mainly caused by habitual beaters and that earnings management by habitual beaters to avoid earnings decreases was less prevalent after J-SOX implementation. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
机译：先前的研究发现，2002年的《萨班斯-奥克斯利法案》（US-SOX）影响了美国的收益管理。科恩等。 （2008年）表明自美国SOX法案通过以来，基于权责发生制的收益管理有所下降，而实际收益管理有所增加。此外，Gilliam等。 （2015年）表明，零收益不连续性自通过以来已经消失，这表明避免亏损的收益管理因此而减少了。在日本，从2008年4月开始的财政年度实施了2006年的《金融工具和交易法》，即所谓的日文版SOX（J-SOX）。与US-SOX相似，J-SOX旨在加强公司财务报告的治理。这项研究调查了J-SOX实施后收益分配和收益变化的不连续性是否消失了。与US-SOX相比，结果表明，实施J-SOX后，收益分配的不连续性为零并没有消失。但是，J-SOX实施后，收益变动分布为零的不连续性几乎消失了，这表明避免收益下降的收益管理变得不那么普遍了。此外，结果表明，在实施J-SOX之前，收益变化分布的不连续性主要是由惯用搅拌器引起的，而在J-SOX实施之后，由惯用搅拌器进行收益管理以避免收入下降的情况较少。 （C）2016 Elsevier Inc.保留所有权利。

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