首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Accounting Research >Discussion of The Use of Management Control Mechanisms to Mitigate Moral Hazard in the Decision to Outsource
【24h】

Discussion of The Use of Management Control Mechanisms to Mitigate Moral Hazard in the Decision to Outsource

机译:在外包决策中使用管理控制机制缓解道德风险的讨论

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           

摘要

Sedatole, Vrettos, and Widener (SVW) contribute to the substantial existing literature that draws on transaction cost economics (TCE) theory to predict and understand the outsourcing relationship. This is a difficult task given the large amount of cross-disciplinary research attention that has been devoted to testing TCE theories about organizational form. Indeed, outsourcing as a form of "make or buy" decision can be considered the paradigm problem of this literature and has been a particularly strong focus of research attention (Shelanski and Klein [2008]). Despite the considerable body of research devoted to this topic, SVW are able to make a unique contribution by investigating the idea that management control mechanisms within the firm are determinants of the extent to which standard equilibrium TCE predictions regarding between-firm exchange relationships hold empirically.
机译:Sedatole,Vrettos和Widener(SVW)为大量现有文献做出了贡献,这些文献利用交易成本经济学(TCE)理论来预测和理解外包关系。鉴于已经投入大量的跨学科研究注意力来测试有关组织形式的TCE理论,这是一项艰巨的任务。实际上,将外包作为“制造或购买”决策的一种形式可以视为该文献的范式问题,并且一直是研究关注的重点(Shelanski and Klein [2008])。尽管针对该主题进行了大量研究,但SVW能够通过调查以下观点做出独特的贡献:企业内部的管理控制机制是企业间交易所关系的标准均衡TCE预测凭经验成立的程度的决定因素。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号