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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Accounting Research >The Use of Management Control Mechanisms to Mitigate Moral Hazard in the Decision to Outsource
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The Use of Management Control Mechanisms to Mitigate Moral Hazard in the Decision to Outsource

机译：在外包决策中使用管理控制机制减轻道德风险

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摘要

Using archival data from the U.S. passenger airline industry, this study examines whether management control mechanisms aimed at mitigating moral hazard explain outsourcing decisions over and above transaction cost economics (TCE) determinants documented in prior research. Consistent with TCE theory, we find that in-house production efficiencies and our proxy for transaction risk (i.e., deriving from transaction infrequency, transaction complexity, and relationship-specific investments) significantly explain the extent of outsourcing of aircraft maintenance. We extend TCE insights to show that incentive delta (i.e., the sensitivity of CEO portfolio holdings to stock price changes) strengthens the negative association between production efficiencies and outsourcing while incentive vega (i.e., the sensitivity of CEO holdings to stock return volatility) weakens the negative association between transaction risk and outsourcing. Monitoring strengthens the negative association between in-house production efficiencies and outsourcing, but has no effect on the transaction risk-outsourcing relation. The results suggest that the use of outsourcing to achieve cost savings is promoted through both incentive contracts and monitoring, but outsourcing to achieve the desired risk level is promoted only through incentive contracts.
机译：本研究使用美国客运航空业的档案数据，研究了旨在减轻道德风险的管理控制机制是否能解释超出先前研究中记录的交易成本经济学（TCE）决定因素之外的外包决策。与传统文化表现形式理论相一致，我们发现内部生产效率以及我们对交易风险的代理（即源自交易频率不高，交易复杂性和特定于关系的投资）显着解释了飞机维修外包的程度。我们扩展了TCE的见解，以显示激励增量（即CEO投资组合持股对股票价格变化的敏感性）增强了生产效率与外包之间的负相关关系，而激励性Vega（即CEO持股对股票收益波动性的敏感性）则削弱了交易风险与外包之间的负相关关系。监控加强了内部生产效率与外包之间的负相关关系，但对交易风险与外包的关系没有影响。结果表明，通过激励合同和监督都促进了使用外包来实现成本节省，但是只有通过激励合同来促进达到期望风险水平的外包。

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