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Impact of bargaining power on supply chain profit allocation: a game-theoretic study

机译：讨价还价能力对供应链利润分配的影响：博弈论研究

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Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of bargaining powers of firms in supply chain coordination. It studies selected aspects of bargaining powers, namely, impatience, breakdown probability and outside options, and uses a bargaining-theoretic approach to analyze surplus allocation in a coordinated supply chain. Design/methodology/approach - This paper proposes one-supplier one-buyer infinite horizon supply chain coordination game, where suppliers and buyers negotiate for the allocation of supply chain surplus arising out of supply chain coordination. Various aspects of the bargaining power of the negotiating parties are modeled and the paper studies impact of power levels on the results of the bargaining game. Findings - A significance of impatience on the bargaining process and the surplus split has been established. This paper also demonstrates a rather counter-intuitive aspect of bargaining that the impatience (as perceived by the other party) can improve the bargaining position and therefore share of profits. Research limitations/implications - This paper has limited its analysis to three key components of bargaining power. Future works can study other aspects of bargaining power, namely information asymmetry, learning curve, inside options, etc. Further, the paper has considered an infinite horizon model - this assumption can be relaxed in future research. Practical implications - Equations to derive optimal split of the surplus have been derived and can be leveraged to design an autonomous bargaining agent to discover equilibrium profit splits in a cloud or e-commerce setting. Further, insights from this paper can be leveraged by managers to understand their relative bargaining power and drive to obtain the best profit split. Originality/value - This paper establishes that impatience (in terms of counter-offer probability) has a significant impact on the bargaining position and on the split of the surplus that the firm can get for themselves. It establishes the advantage of higher levels of impatience, provided the other party recognizes the impatience and factors it in their decision-making process.
机译：目的-本文的目的是研究公司的议价能力对供应链协调的影响。它研究了议价能力的选定方面，即急躁，崩溃概率和外部选择权，并使用议价理论方法分析了协调供应链中的剩余分配。设计/方法/方法-本文提出了一个供方一买方的无限期供应链协调博弈，供方和买方协商由供应链协调产生的供应链剩余的分配。对谈判方的议价能力的各个方面进行了建模，并且本文研究了权力水平对议价博弈结果的影响。调查结果-已经建立了耐心进行讨价还价和剩余分割的重要意义。本文还展示了讨价还价的一个反直觉的方面，即急躁（如另一方所知）可以提高讨价还价的地位，从而提高利润分成。研究局限性/含义-本文将其分析限于讨价还价能力的三个关键组成部分。未来的工作可以研究议价能力的其他方面，即信息不对称性，学习曲线，内部期权等。此外，本文还考虑了无限期模型-该假设可以在未来的研究中放宽。实际意义-已经得出了用于推导盈余最佳分配的方程式，并且可以利用这些方程式来设计自主的议价代理，以发现云或电子商务环境中的均衡利润分配。此外，管理者可以利用本文的见解来了解其相对的议价能力，并争取获得最佳的利润分配。独创性/价值-本文确定，不耐烦（就还价可能性而言）对议价能力和企业可自行获得的盈余分配有重大影响。它提供了更高程度的不耐烦的优势，只要另一方认识到不耐烦及其在决策过程中的因素。

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