• 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文期刊>Journal of advances in management research >Impact of bargaining power on supply chain profit allocation: a game-theoretic study
【24h】

Impact of bargaining power on supply chain profit allocation: a game-theoretic study

机译：讨价还价权对供应链利润分配的影响：游戏 - 理论研究

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of bargaining powers of firms in supply chain coordination. It studies selected aspects of bargaining powers, namely, impatience, breakdown probability and outside options, and uses a bargaining-theoretic approach to analyze surplus allocation in a coordinated supply chain. Design/methodology/approach - This paper proposes one-supplier one-buyer infinite horizon supply chain coordination game, where suppliers and buyers negotiate for the allocation of supply chain surplus arising out of supply chain coordination. Various aspects of the bargaining power of the negotiating parties are modeled and the paper studies impact of power levels on the results of the bargaining game. Findings - A significance of impatience on the bargaining process and the surplus split has been established. This paper also demonstrates a rather counter-intuitive aspect of bargaining that the impatience (as perceived by the other party) can improve the bargaining position and therefore share of profits. Research limitations/implications - This paper has limited its analysis to three key components of bargaining power. Future works can study other aspects of bargaining power, namely information asymmetry, learning curve, inside options, etc. Further, the paper has considered an infinite horizon model - this assumption can be relaxed in future research. Practical implications - Equations to derive optimal split of the surplus have been derived and can be leveraged to design an autonomous bargaining agent to discover equilibrium profit splits in a cloud or e-commerce setting. Further, insights from this paper can be leveraged by managers to understand their relative bargaining power and drive to obtain the best profit split. Originality/value - This paper establishes that impatience (in terms of counter-offer probability) has a significant impact on the bargaining position and on the split of the surplus that the firm can get for themselves. It establishes the advantage of higher levels of impatience, provided the other party recognizes the impatience and factors it in their decision-making process.
机译：目的 - 本文的目的是研究讨价还价的公司在供应链协调中的影响。它研究了讨价还价的权力的选定方面，即不耐烦，崩溃概率和外部选项，并使用讨价还价的理论方法来分析协调供应链中的盈余分配。设计/方法/方法 - 本文提出了一家供应商一体买家无限的地平线供应链协调游戏，供应商和买家谈判供应链协调出现的供应链盈余分配。谈判缔约方的讨价还价权的各个方面是建模的，纸张研究权力水平对议价游戏结果的影响。调查结果 - 建立了对讨价还价过程和盈余分裂的重要性。本文还展示了一个相当反向直观的方面，讨价还价（另一方所感知）可以改善讨价还价地位，从而占利率。研究限制/含义 - 本文将其分析限制为议价权力的三个关键部件。未来的作品可以研究讨价还价权的其他方面，即信息不对称，学习曲线，内部选项等。此外，本文认为无限的地平线模型 - 这种假设可以在未来的研究中放松。实际意义 - 派生了越野的最佳分裂的方程，可以利用设计自主讨价还价的代理，以发现云或电子商务环境中的均衡利润分裂。此外，来自管理者可以利用本文的见解，了解他们相对讨价还价的电力和驱动以获得最佳利润分裂。原创/价值 - 本文确定了不耐烦（在反议价概率方面）对讨价还价的位置产生重大影响，并在该公司可以自行实现的盈余的分裂。它建立了更高水平不耐烦的优势，只要另一方就会认识到其决策过程中的不耐烦和因素。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号