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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of applied econometrics >Labour supply, service intensity, and contracts: Theory and evidence on physicians
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Labour supply, service intensity, and contracts: Theory and evidence on physicians

机译：劳动力供应，服务强度和合同：医师的理论和证据

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摘要

Based on linked administrative and survey panel data, we analyse the labour supply behaviour of physicians who could adopt either a standard fee-for-service contract or a mixed remuneration (MR) contract. Under MR, physicians received a per diem and a reduced fee for services provided. We present estimates of a structural discrete choice model that incorporates service intensity (services provided per hour) and contract choice into a labour supply framework. We use our estimates to predict (ex ante) the effects of contracts on physician behaviour and welfare, as measured by average equivalent variations. The supply of services is reduced under an MR contract, suggesting incentives matter. Hours spent seeing patients is less sensitive to incentives than the supply of services. Our results suggest that a reform forcing all physicians to adopt the MR system would have substantially larger effects on physician behaviour than were measured under the observed reform. A pure salary (per diem) reform would sharply reduce services but would increase time spent seeing patients.
机译：根据联系的行政和调查小组数据，我们分析了能够采用标准的服务费合同或混合薪酬（MR）合同的医生的劳动力供应行为。根据MR，医生收到每日津贴，并提供减少的服务费。我们展示了结构离散选择模型的估计，将服务强度（每小时提供的服务）并入劳动供应框架中的合同选择。我们利用我们的估计来预测（前进）合同对医生行为和福利的影响，按照平均等同变化测量。在合约律师的情况下，服务供应减少，提示激励物质。花费时间看见患者对奖励的敏感性不如服务供应敏感。我们的研究结果表明，改革强迫所有医生采用MR系统对医生行为的影响大幅增加，而不是在观察到的改革下衡量。纯薪水（每日）改革将大幅减少服务，但会增加患者的时间。

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  • 来源
    《Journal of applied econometrics》 |2021年第6期|686-702|共17页
  • 作者

    Fortin Bernard; Jacquemet Nicolas; Shearer Bruce;

  • 作者单位

    Univ Laval Dept Econ CRREP IZA Quebec City PQ Canada|CIRANO Quebec City PQ Canada;

    Paris Sch Econ Paris France|Univ Paris 1 Pantheon Sorbonne Ctr Econ Sorbonne Paris France;

    Univ Laval Dept Econ CRREP IZA Quebec City PQ Canada|CIRANO Quebec City PQ Canada;

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