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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists >The Incentive to Overinvest in Energy Efficiency: Evidence from Hourly Smart-Meter Data
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The Incentive to Overinvest in Energy Efficiency: Evidence from Hourly Smart-Meter Data

机译：对能源效率进行过度投资的诱因：来自每小时智能电表数据的证据

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摘要

Many households pay a marginal price for electricity that exceeds the marginal social cost of supplying that electricity. We show evidence that such pricing schemes can create an incentive to overinvest in energy efficiency. Using hourly smart-meter data for households facing time-invariant increasing block prices, we estimate how air conditioner upgrades affect electricity use. We find that the average participating household reduces consumption by 5%, which provides private savings in the form of lower electricity bills and social cost savings by decreasing generation and pollution costs. The private savings exceed the social savings by an average of 140%, so the average household is faced with an incentive to overinvest in energy efficiency. This incentive to overinvest in energy efficiency would be cut in half if consumers faced any one of three alternative pricing plans with lower marginal price but the same average price.
机译：许多家庭为电力支付的边际价格超过了提供电力的边际社会成本。我们有证据表明，这样的定价方案可以激励人们对能源效率进行过度投资。使用面向小时不变的大宗价格上涨的家庭的每小时智能电表数据，我们估计空调的升级如何影响用电。我们发现，参与计划的普通家庭将能耗降低了5％，从而通过降低电费和降低发电和污染成本的方式节省了社会成本，从而提供了私人储蓄。私人储蓄平均超过社会储蓄140％，因此普通家庭面临着过度投资于能源效率的诱因。如果消费者面临三种边际价格较低但平均价格相同的替代定价计划中的任何一种，则将这种对能源效率进行过度投资的动机减少了一半。

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