• 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文期刊>Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists >Market-Based Emissions Regulation When Damages Vary across Sources: What Are the Gains from Differentiation?
【24h】

Market-Based Emissions Regulation When Damages Vary across Sources: What Are the Gains from Differentiation?

机译：当损害因来源而异时，基于市场的排放法规：差异化带来了哪些收益？

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

For much of the air pollution currently regulated under US emissions trading programs, health and environmental damages vary significantly with the location of the source. Existing policies do not reflect this variation. Market-based policies can be designed to accommodate nonuniformly mixed pollution by using emissions penalties that vary with damages. With perfect information and heterogeneous damages, damage-based policy differentiation is unambiguously welfare improving. In contrast, when damages and abatement costs are uncertain, differentiated policies need not welfare-dominate undifferentiated designs. Using a large-scale US emissions trading program as a case in point, we show how undifferentiated emissions trading can dominate the differentiated alternative when ex post abatement costs exceeded expectations. In contrast, under an emissions tax regime the welfare dominance of the first-best differentiated policy is robust to unanticipated cost realizations.
机译：对于目前受美国排放交易计划监管的大部分空气污染，健康和环境损害随排放源的位置而有很大不同。现有政策并未反映出这种差异。基于市场的政策可以设计为通过使用随损害而变化的排放罚则来适应非均匀混合污染。凭借完善的信息和不同的损失，基于损害的政策差异无疑会改善福利。相反，当损害和减排成本不确定时，差异化的政策就不必以福利为主导而差异化的设计。以大型美国排放交易计划为例，我们展示了事后减排成本超出预期时，未区别的排放交易将如何主导差异化的替代方案。相比之下，在排放税制度下，最佳差别政策的福利优势对于未预期的成本实现是强有力的。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号