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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists >Property Rights, Regulatory Capture, and Exploitation of Natural Resources
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Property Rights, Regulatory Capture, and Exploitation of Natural Resources

机译：产权，监管获取和自然资源开发

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摘要

We study how the strength of property rights to individual extractive firms affects a regulator’s choice over exploitation rates for a natural resource. The regulator is modeled as an intermediary between current and future resource harvesters rather than between producers and consumers, as in the traditional regulatory capture paradigm. When incumbent resource users have weak property rights, they have an incentive to pressure the regulator to allow resource extraction at an inefficiently rapid rate. The main theoretical prediction—that stronger individual property rights will lead the regulator to choose more economically efficient extraction paths—is tested empirically with novel panel data from global fisheries. Exploiting the variation in timing of Catch Share implementation, as well as employing an instrumental variables strategy, we find that regulators are significantly more conservative in managing resources for which firms have strong property rights; this is especially pronounced for resources that have been historically overexploited.
机译：我们研究了单个采掘公司的产权实力如何影响监管机构对自然资源开采率的选择。监管者被建模为当前和未来资源收获者之间的中介，而不是像传统的监管获取范例那样，是生产者与消费者之间的中介。当现有资源使用者的产权薄弱时，他们就有动力向监管机构施压，要求其以效率低下的快速速度开采资源。主要的理论预测（即更强的个人财产权将导致监管机构选择更经济有效的开采途径）已通过全球渔业的最新面板数据进行了经验检验。利用渔获量实施时间的变化以及采用工具变量策略，我们发现监管机构在管理拥有强大产权的资源方面要更加保守。对于历来被过度开发的资源而言，这尤其明显。

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