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Public Policy and the Private Provision of Public Goods under Heterogeneous Preferences

机译:异质偏好下的公共政策与公共物品的私人提供

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We compare the relative efficiency of second-best policies designed to promote the private provision of public goods. We use the provision of local public goods as our central example and discuss settings in which the model extends to choices over energy-consuming durables. We introduce preference heterogeneity by allowing a subset of agents to value the public good more than others, reflecting a form of prosocial preference. We further assume that agents face convex costs of provision, an assumption that accords well with individually provided public goods such as neighborhood amenities. We show that minimum standards are often more efficient than uniform price-based incentives in this setting. Extending our model to allow for both benefit and cost heterogeneity, we show how policy choice depends on the strength and correlation between the two forms of heterogeneity.
机译:我们比较了旨在促进私人提供公共物品的次优政策的相对效率。我们以提供本地公共物品为中心示例,并讨论了将模型扩展到对耗能耐用品的选择的设置。我们通过允许代理人的一个子集比其他人更重视公共物品来引入偏好异质性,这反映了亲社会偏好的一种形式。我们进一步假设代理人面临着凸现的提供成本,这一假设与个人提供的公共物品(如社区便利设施)非常吻合。我们证明,在这种情况下,最低标准通常比统一的基于价格的激励措施更为有效。扩展我们的模型以允许收益和成本异质性,我们展示了政策选择如何取决于两种异质性形式之间的强度和相关性。

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