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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of banking & finance >Deposit competition and loan markets
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Deposit competition and loan markets

机译：存款竞争和贷款市场

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Less-intense competition for deposits, by mitigating banks' incentive to take excessive risks, is traditionally believed to lead to lower non-performing loan (NFL) ratios and more-stable banks. This paper revisits this proposition in a model with borrower moral hazard in which banks' NPL ratios depend endogenously on their loan pricing. In relatively uncompetitive loan markets, less-fierce competition for deposits (i.e., lower deposit rates) leads to lower loan rates and, thus, safer loans. In more-competitive markets, the opposite can occur: As banks' deposit-repayment burdens decline, they become less eager to risk-shift; this softens competition for risky loans, leading to higher loan rates and, ultimately, riskier loans. Overall, the model predicts a hump-shaped relationship between banks' pricing power in deposit markets and their NPL ratios. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机译：传统上，人们认为通过降低银行承担过多风险的动机来降低存款竞争的难度，从而导致不良贷款率降低，银行变得更加稳定。本文在具有借款人道德风险的模型中重新审视了这一主张，在该模型中，银行的不良贷款比率内生地取决于其贷款定价。在竞争相对较弱的贷款市场中，对存款的较不激烈的竞争（即较低的存款利率）导致较低的贷款利率，从而使贷款更安全。在竞争更激烈的市场中，可能会发生相反的情况：随着银行的存款偿还负担减少，它们变得不急于转移风险；这会降低对高风险贷款的竞争，导致更高的贷款利率，最终导致风险更高的贷款。总体而言，该模型预测银行在存款市场中的定价能力与其不良贷款率之间呈驼峰形关系。 （C）2017 Elsevier B.V.保留所有权利。

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