• 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Behavioral Decision Making >Temporal Dynamics of Cooperation
【24h】

Temporal Dynamics of Cooperation

机译：合作的时间动态

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

Parties in real-world conflicts often attempt to punish each other's behavior. If this strategy fails to produce mutual cooperation, they may increase punishment magnitude. The present experiment investigated whether delay reduction-potentially less harmful than magnitude increase-would generate mutual cooperation as interactions are repeated. The participants played a prisoner's dilemma game against a computer that played a tit-for-tat strategy, cooperating after a participant cooperated, defecting after a participant defected. For half the participants, the delay between their choice and the computer's next choice was long relative to the delay between the computer's choice and their next choice. For the other half, long and short delays were reversed. The tit-for-tat contingency reinforces the other player's cooperation (by cooperating) and punishes the other player's defection (by defecting). Both the rewards and the punishments are discounted by delay. Consistent with delay discounting, the participants cooperated more when the delay between their choice and the computer's cooperation (reward) or defection (punishment) was relatively short. These results suggest that, in real-world tit-for-tat conflicts, the decreasing delay of reciprocation or retaliation may foster mutual cooperation as effectively as (or more effectively than) the more usual tactic of increasing magnitude of reciprocation or retaliation.
机译：现实世界中的冲突各方经常试图惩罚对方的行为。如果该策略无法产生相互合作，则可能会增加惩罚力度。本实验研究了延迟减少（可能比幅度增加潜在的危害小）是否会由于重复交互而产生相互合作。参与者在计算机上玩了一个囚徒困境游戏，该计算机扮演了针锋相对的策略，在参与者合作之后进行合作，在参与者叛逃之后叛逃。对于一半的参与者来说，他们的选择与计算机的下一个选择之间的延迟相对于计算机的选择与下一个选择之间的延迟是很长的。对于另一半，长和短的延迟被扭转。针锋相对的偶然性加强了另一方玩家的合作（通过合作）并惩罚了另一方玩家的叛逃（通过背叛）。奖励和惩罚都被拖延了。与延迟折扣相一致，当参与者的选择与计算机合作（奖励）或叛逃（惩罚）之间的延迟相对较短时，参与者会进行更多的合作。这些结果表明，在现实世界的针锋相对的冲突中，往复运动或报复行为减少的延迟减少可能会促进相互合作，就像（或更有效地）促进往复运动或报复行为的更为普遍的策略一样。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号