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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of business and economic perspectives >Audit Reporting Lag as a Predictor of Bankruptcy
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Audit Reporting Lag as a Predictor of Bankruptcy

机译：审计报告滞后预测破产

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This study examines the usefulness of audit reporting lags for the prediction of bankruptcy. There is indication in prior research (Givoly and Palmon 1982, Ashton et al. 1987, Newton and Ashton 1989, Bamber et al. 1993, and Mutchler et al. 1997) that such may be the case, since factors associated with bankruptcy such as modified opinions, the disclosure of contingencies and extraordinary items, and financial distress are also associated with longer audit reporting lags. Further, there is anecdotal evidence in the bankruptcy prediction literature (e.g., see Ohlson 1980) that auditors may consciously and willingly delay issuing an audit report for companies on the brink of bankruptcy. The motivation for the study centers upon the impact of excessive audit delays on stakeholder decisions. Certainly, the delay of an audit report deprives stakeholders of important information, especially for highly distressed companies. However, whether the occurrence of an audit delay, in itself, conveys information has not been studied. This study addresses this issue by examining whether a non-decision by the auditor (i.e., excessive audit reporting lags) can be interpreted as prima facie bad news about future corporate viability. Results support the contention that excessive audit delays contain information. Results show a strong and robust relationship between abnormal audit reporting lag and the probability of bankruptcy. Thus, from the perspective of an outside stakeholder, delays in the release of the audit report, especially for companies already exhibiting signs of financial distress, are a strong red flag for impending bankruptcy.
机译：本研究考察了审计报告滞后对预测破产的有用性。先前的研究表明（Givoly和Palmon 1982，Ashton等1987，Newton和Ashton 1989，Bamber等1993和Mutchler等1997），因为与破产相关的因素例如修改意见，突发事件和非常规项目的披露以及财务困境也与更长的审计报告滞后时间相关。此外，破产预测文献中有轶事证据（例如，参见Ohlson 1980），审计师可能有意识地并愿意推迟为濒临破产的公司发布审计报告。研究的动机集中在过度审计延迟对利益相关者决策的影响上。当然，审计报告的延迟会剥夺利益相关者的重要信息，特别是对于那些陷入困境的公司。但是，尚未研究审核延迟的发生本身是否传达信息。本研究通过检查审计师的不作决定（即过多的审计报告滞后）是否可以被解释为有关未来公司生存能力的表面上坏消息，来解决此问题。结果支持以下观点：过度的审计延迟包含信息。结果表明，异常审计报告滞后与破产概率之间有很强的关系。因此，从外部利益相关者的角度来看，延迟发布审计报告（尤其是对于已经表现出财务困境迹象的公司）是即将破产的强烈信号。

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