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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Business Ethics >The Impact of CFOs' Incentives and Earnings Management Ethics on their Financial Reporting Decisions: The Mediating Role of Moral Disengagement
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The Impact of CFOs' Incentives and Earnings Management Ethics on their Financial Reporting Decisions: The Mediating Role of Moral Disengagement

机译：首席财务官的激励和收益管理道德观念对其财务报告决策的影响：道德脱离接触的中介作用

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摘要

Despite regulatory reforms aimed at inhibiting aggressive financial reporting, earnings management persists and continues to concern practitioners, regulators, and standard setters. To provide insight into this practice and how to mitigate it, we conduct an experiment to examine the impact of two independent variables on CFOs' discretionary expense accruals. One independent variable, incentive conflict, is manipulated at two levels (present and absent)-i.e., the presence or absence of a personal financial incentive that conflicts with a corporate financial incentive. The other independent variable is CFOs' earnings management ethics ("EM-Ethics," high vs. low), measured as their assessment of the ethicalness of key earnings management motivations. We find that incentive conflict and EM-Ethics interact to determine CFOs' discretionary accruals such that (a) in the presence of incentive conflict, CFOs with low (high) EM-Ethics tend to give into (resist) the personal incentive by booking higher (lower) expense accruals; and (b) in the absence of an incentive conflict, CFOs with low (high) EM-Ethics tend to give into (resist) the corporate incentive by booking lower (higher) expense accruals. We also find support for a mediated-moderation model in which CFOs' level of EM-Ethics influences their moral disengagement tendencies which, in turn, differentially affect their discretionary accruals, depending on the presence or absence of incentive conflict. Theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed.
机译：尽管进行了旨在抑制激进财务报告的监管改革，但是盈余管理仍然存在，并继续引起从业者，监管者和标准制定者的关注。为了深入了解这种做法以及如何减轻这种做法，我们进行了一项实验，以检验两个独立变量对CFO的可自由支配费用应计额的影响。一个独立的变量，激励冲突，在两个级别（当前和不存在）上进行操纵，即存在或不存在与公司财务激励相冲突的个人财务激励。另一个独立变量是首席财务官的盈余管理道德标准（“ EM-Ethics”，高或低），以其对关键盈余管理动机的道德标准的评估来衡量。我们发现，激励冲突和EM-伦理相互影响来确定CFO的自由裁量权，使得（a）在存在激励冲突的情况下，EM-Eth较低（较高）的CFO倾向于通过提高订价来抵制（抵制）个人激励（较低）应计费用； （b）在没有激励冲突的情况下，具有较低（较高）EM道德的CFO倾向于通过预定较低（较高）的费用应计费用来（抵制）公司激励。我们还发现了一种中介调节模型的支持，在这种模型中，首席财务官的EM-Ethics水平会影响他们的道德脱离接触倾向，进而取决于是否存在激励冲突，从而影响他们的自由裁量权产生。讨论了这些发现的理论和实践意义。

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