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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Business Research >Inside directors and the underinvestment of financial slack towards R & D-intensity in high-technology firms
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Inside directors and the underinvestment of financial slack towards R & D-intensity in high-technology firms

机译：内部董事和高科技公司研发力量不足对财务的投入不足

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摘要

Agency theory emphasizes the role of outside directors in mitigating free cash flow (FCF) problems, such as overinvesting FCF's into negative NPV R & D projects. In this paper we draw on and extend agency theory to argue that the underinvestment of financial slack towards a persistently high R &D-intensity is actually a greater problem for high-tech firms. Specifically, we claim that inside directors play a critical role for the board in safeguarding R &D investment by monitoring the CEO, and mitigating informational asymmetries for independent directors. We test our theory using a panel-data set of S &P 1500 firms in R & D-intensive industries from 1997 to 2007. Our empirical analysis reveals that inside directors positively influence the relationship between financial slack and R &D-intensity, and that their ability to ensure cash holdings are used to preserve R &D matters the most during periods of financial distress.
机译：代理理论强调外部董事在缓解自由现金流（FCF）问题（例如将FCF过度投资到负NPV研发项目）中的作用。在本文中，我们借鉴并扩展了代理理论，以证明对高科技企业而言，持续的高研发强度导致的财务闲置投资不足实际上是一个更大的问题。具体而言，我们声称内部董事在董事会中发挥着关键作用，它通过监督CEO以及减轻独立董事的信息不对称来保护研发投资。我们使用1997年至2007年间R＆D密集型行业的S＆P 1500家公司的面板数据集对我们的理论进行了检验。我们的经验分析表明，内部董事对财务松弛与R＆D强度之间的关系具有积极影响，并且确保在财务困境期间最大程度地利用现金持有量来保留研发事宜的能力。

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