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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Business Research >Listening to workers: The overtime versus hiring dilemma
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Listening to workers: The overtime versus hiring dilemma

机译：倾听工人的声音：加班与招聘困境

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摘要

To reach a certain production level, firms sometimes allow overtime and/or adjust the number of their personnel. Under some circumstances, workers can decide to work overtime to gain additional compensation, even though the firm might not need that time. This type of overtime exists because of an information asymmetry that favors workers: they know better than management the everyday routines, the temporary bottlenecks, and the malfunctions in the workplace. This study models this situation as an infinitely repeated game. In each stage-game the workers decide whether to work overtime, and the firm decides whether to adjust the amount of personnel. The game characterizes the conditions of the Nash equilibriums, some of which might lead to collaborative communication between the workers and the firm. The study empirically tests two propositions with data from a Chilean smelting plant. The results identify under which circumstances the firm should "listen" to the workers (i.e., take into account how much overtime they incur) when making personnel decisions.
机译：为了达到一定的生产水平，公司有时会允许加班和/或调整人员数量。在某些情况下，即使公司可能不需要加班，工人也可以决定加班以获取额外的报酬。之所以存在这种类型的加班，是因为信息不对称有利于员工：他们比管理日常工作，临时瓶颈和工作场所的故障要了解得多。本研究将这种情况建模为无限重复的博弈。在每个阶段的游戏中，工人决定是否加班，而公司决定是否调整人员数量。博弈刻画了纳什均衡的条件，其中某些条件可能导致工人与企业之间进行协作性沟通。这项研究使用来自智利一家冶炼厂的数据对两个命题进行了经验检验。结果确定了在做出人事决定时公司应在哪种情况下“听”工人的意见（即考虑到他们要招致多少加班）。

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