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Cash versus incentive compensation: Lawsuits and director pay

机译：现金与激励性薪酬：诉讼和董事薪酬

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摘要

The role of the board of directors is to oversee managerial decisions and to protect the interests of shareholders. While director pay historically is a small cash fee, many corporations now use both stock and option grants as a part of a director's compensation. This paper examines whether this incentive pay aligns the interests of directors with those of the shareholders. We study the special case of shareholder lawsuits that specifically name the board of directors. These lawsuits indicate a breakdown in the trust and therefore the relationship between shareholders and directors. We find that when directors are paid with high incentive pay (designed to align their interests with shareholders) there is a greater incidence of lawsuits. Interestingly, greater cash compensation actually reduces the likelihood of a lawsuit.
机译：董事会的作用是监督管理决策并保护股东利益。从历史上看，董事酬金是一笔不小的现金费用，但许多公司现在都将股票和期权赠款作为董事酬金的一部分。本文研究了这种激励性薪酬是否使董事与股东的利益保持一致。我们研究了专门针对董事会命名的股东诉讼的特殊情况。这些诉讼表明信托业务破裂，因此表明股东与董事之间的关系。我们发现，当董事以高额奖励金（旨在使他们的利益与股东保持一致）获得报酬时，诉讼的发生率就会增加。有趣的是，更高的现金补偿实际上减少了提起诉讼的可能性。

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