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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of management & governance >The effect of outside directors' and auditors' incentives on managers' ability to manage cash bonuses
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The effect of outside directors' and auditors' incentives on managers' ability to manage cash bonuses

机译：外部董事和审计师的激励措施对经理人管理现金奖金能力的影响

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摘要

This paper investigates the impact of outside directors' and auditors' monetary incentives on the association between discretionary accounting and managers' cash bonuses in a two-tier system. For a sample of German stock corporations from 2005 to 2007 we expect and find that outside directors who receive compensation based on accounting income and auditors who receive high non-audit fees have the incentive to tolerate managers' bonus-increasing accounting choices. More specifically, we show that positive discretionary accruals are more strongly associated with managers' cash bonuses than negative discretionary accruals if outside directors receive accounting-based compensation and/or if auditors receive high non-audit fees. Our results suggest that executives' ability to manage their cash bonuses depends on the monitoring institutions' monetary incentives.
机译：本文研究了外部董事和审计师的货币激励对两级系统中自由裁量会计和经理现金红利之间的关系的影响。对于2005年至2007年的德国股份公司样本，我们期望并发现，根据会计收入获得报酬的外部董事和收取高额非审计费用的审计师都有动机容忍经理人增加奖金的会计选择。更具体地说，我们表明，如果外部董事获得基于会计的报酬和/或审计师获得高额的非审计费用，则与经理人的现金红利相比，积极的可自由支配的应付款与负的可支配的应付款更紧密地相关。我们的结果表明，高管人员管理现金奖金的能力取决于监控机构的货币激励。

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