• 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Cleaner Production >Carbon emission reduction and promotion policies considering social preferences and consumers' low-carbon awareness in the cap-and-trade system
【24h】

Carbon emission reduction and promotion policies considering social preferences and consumers' low-carbon awareness in the cap-and-trade system

机译：在总量控制与交易系统中考虑社会偏好和消费者的低碳意识的碳减排和促进政策

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

We incorporate social preferences, which are divided into relationship preferences and status preferences, and consumer low-carbon awareness into a supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer under the cap-and-trade system. First, we suppress the price policies and investigate the manufacturer's carbon-emission reduction strategy and the leading retailer's low-carbon-related promotion strategy with and without the agents' social preferences. Then, we analyze the game dominated by the manufacturer with and without considering pricing policies. We prove that consumer low-carbon awareness improvement incentives channel members to invest in emission reduction and promotion and that this investment is beneficial to member profits and utilities. The channel members' utilities increase with their social preference value. However, their profits, emission-reduction level and promotion level might not necessarily do so. In the manufacturer-led supply chain, wholesale price increases with the retailer's social preference value and decreases with that of the manufacturer. The retail price decreases with the manufacturer's social preference value and increases with that of the retailer. The manners that the leader's decision affects the follower's decision-making and the channel members' social preferences affect their decision-making depend on who the dominator is in the supply chain. In addition, we design a new contract and coordinate the supply chain in the presence of the agents' social preferences. With the contract, the company's utility increment increases with its own social preference value and decreases with that of its cooperator. (C) 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
机译：我们将社会偏好分为关系偏好和地位偏好，以及消费者的低碳意识，将其纳入总量控制与交易系统下的一家制造商和一家零售商的供应链中。首先，我们压制价格政策，并研究制造商的碳减排策略和主要零售商在有或没有代理商社会偏好的情况下的低碳相关促销策略。然后，我们分析有无定价政策的情况下，由制造商主导的游戏。我们证明，提高消费者低碳意识的激励措施引导成员投资于减少排放和促进排放，并且这项投资有益于成员的利润和公用事业。渠道成员的效用随着他们的社会偏好价值而增加。但是，他们的利润，减排水平和促进水平不一定是这样做的。在制造商主导的供应链中，批发价格随零售商的社会偏好值而增加，而随制造商的社会偏好值而降低。零售价格随制造商的社会偏好值而降低，而随零售商的社会偏好值而升高。领导者的决定会影响跟随者的决策，渠道成员的社会偏好会影响他们的决策，这取决于供应链中的主导者。此外，我们设计了新的合同并在代理商的社会偏好存在的情况下协调供应链。通过合同，公司的效用增加随其自身的社会偏好值而增加，而随其合作者的效用而减少。 （C）2018 Elsevier Ltd.保留所有权利。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号