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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Cleaner Production >Differential game model of joint emission reduction strategies and contract design in a dual-channel supply chain
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Differential game model of joint emission reduction strategies and contract design in a dual-channel supply chain

机译：双渠道供应链中联合减排策略与合同设计的差分博弈模型

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Joint emission reduction is widely used in low-carbon supply chain practices. It consists of the manufacturer's emission reduction and the retailer's advertising campaign. In this paper, we present a differential game that involves one manufacturer and one retailer in a dual-channel supply chain under low-carbon environment. We analyze the optimal equilibrium strategies in centralized and decentralized dual-channel supply chains, and compare the results of the single channel and dual-channel supply chains. We also discuss how the cooperative advertising contract and the cooperative advertising and emission reduction cost sharing contract affect the optimal strategies and coordination of dual-channel supply chains. Our results suggest that the emission reduction level trajectory is monotonic, whereas the goodwill trajectory changes direction once at most. Wholesale price and the degree of customer loyalty to the retail channel exert a significant influence on optimal strategies. Manufacturer's profit and emission reduction effort are higher and retailer's profit and advertising effort are lower in a dual channel supply chain than in a single channel supply chain. The cooperative advertising and emission reduction cost sharing contract is more efficient than the cooperative advertising contract under certain conditions, and a high low-carbon and brand preference of consumers indicates a greater likelihood that the supply chain members will adopt the contract. The results can provide a theoretical basis for supply chain members to make optimal decisions and choose the appropriate contract in a dual-channel supply chain under low-carbon environment. (C) 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
机译：联合减排被广泛用于低碳供应链实践中。它包括制造商的减排量和零售商的广告活动。在本文中，我们提出了一种在低碳环境下涉及双渠道供应链中的一个制造商和一个零售商的差分游戏。我们分析了集中式和分散式双通道供应链中的最佳均衡策略，并比较了单通道和双通道供应链的结果。我们还将讨论合作广告合同以及合作广告和减排成本分摊合同如何影响双渠道供应链的最优策略和协调。我们的结果表明，减排水平轨迹是单调的，而商誉轨迹最多只能改变一次方向。批发价格和客户对零售渠道的忠诚度对最佳策略产生重大影响。与单渠道供应链相比，双渠道供应链中制造商的利润和减排努力更高，而零售商的利润和广告努力更低。在某些条件下，合作广告和减排成本分摊合同比合作广告合同更有效，并且消费者对低碳和品牌的高度偏好表明供应链成员采用合同的可能性更大。研究结果可为低碳环境下双渠道供应链中的供应链成员做出最佳决策和选择合适的合同提供理论依据。 （C）2018 Elsevier Ltd.保留所有权利。

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