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Transboundary water pollution and promotion incentives in China

机译：中国跨界水污染和促进激励措施

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This paper discusses the causes of water pollution at political borders in China from the perspective of promotion incentives. Officials are promoted based on the achievements of standards that are categorized into (1) the expected targets that should compete with other officials, such as economic performance, and (2) the binding goals that limit the minimum level of effort required, like pollution reduction. Using the dynamic panel and panel threshold model on cities along 18 major rivers in China, we analyzed how the government balances economic performance and pollution reduction targets and explained why the government neglects environmental regulation along political borders. We found relative economic performance is positively related to environmental enforcement effort. While the effect of economic performance on environmental regulation effort is non-linear. Relative economic performance is negatively related to the environmental enforcement effort when relative economic performance is lower than the threshold; for the other, relative economic performance is still positively connected to environmental regulation effort. The relative economic performance of downstream border cities is far below the panel threshold, and governments cannot obtain a competitive advantage regarding economic growth. The absence of promotion incentives results in the neglect of environmental supervision for governments at borders. (C) 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
机译：本文从促进激励措施的角度探讨了中国政治边界水污染的原因。官员是根据分类为（1）应与其他官员（如经济绩效）竞争的预期目标的准则，以及（2）限制所需最低努力水平的约束目标，如污染。在中国的18个主要河流中使用动态面板和面板阈值型号，我们分析了政府如何平衡经济绩效和污染减排目标，并解释了政府疏忽政治边界的环境监管。我们发现相对经济绩效与环境执法努力正相关。虽然经济绩效对环境监管的影响是非线性的。当相对经济绩效低于门槛时，相对经济绩效与环境执法努力负相关;对于另一方，相对经济绩效仍然与环境监管努力正相关。下游边境城市的相对经济表现远远低于面板门槛，政府无法获得有关经济增长的竞争优势。缺乏促销激励导致忽视国界政府的环境监督。 （c）2020 elestvier有限公司保留所有权利。

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