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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of consumer policy >A Tale of Two Markets: How Lower-end Borrowers Are Punished for Bank Regulatory Failures in Nigeria
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A Tale of Two Markets: How Lower-end Borrowers Are Punished for Bank Regulatory Failures in Nigeria

机译：两种市场的故事：低端借款人如何在尼日利亚的银行监管失败中受到惩罚

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In 2009, the Nigerian banking system witnessed a financial crisis caused by elite borrowers in the financial market. Regulatory response to the Nigerian crisis closely mirrored the international response with increased capital and liquidity thresholds for commercial banks. While the rise of consumer protection on the agenda of prudential supervisors internationally was logical in that consumer debt was the main cause of the global recession, the Nigerian banking reforms of 2009 disproportionately affected access by poorer consumers, who ironically had little to do with the underlying causes of the crisis. As lending criteria become more stringent, poorer consumers of credit products are pushed into informal markets because of liquidity-induced credit rationing. Overall, consumer protection is compromised because stronger consumer protection rules for the formal sector benefits borrowers from formal institutions who constitute the minority of borrowers in all markets. While the passage of regulation establishing credit bureaux and the National Collateral Registry will, in theory, ease access to credit especially by lower-end borrowers, the vast size of the informal market continues to compound the information asymmetry problem, fiscal policies to tackle structural economic issues such as unemployment and illiteracy remain to be initiated, and bank regulators continue to pander to elite customers with policy responses that endorse too big to fail but deems lower-end consumers too irrelevant to save. The essay concluded that addressing the wide disparity in access to credit between the rich and poor through property rights reforms to capture the capital of the informal class, promoting regulation to check loan concentration, and stimulating competition by allowing Telecommunication Companies (TELCOs) and fintech companies to carry on lending activities because of their superior knowledge of lower-end markets will facilitate greater access. The risk of systemic failure deriving from consumer credit in Nigeria is insignificant compared to the consumer vulnerabilities resulting from the exposure of consumers to unregulated products in the informal market.
机译：2009年，尼日利亚银行系统目睹了金融市场中精英借款人造成的金融危机。对尼日利亚危机的监管响应与商业银行的资本和流动性门槛的增加，密切反映了国际反应。虽然消费者保护在国际审慎监管议程上的兴起是令人统一的，因为消费者债务是全球经济衰退的主要原因，2009年尼日利亚银行业改革对较贫穷的消费者受到讽刺意味的差异影响危机的原因。由于贷款标准变得更加严格，由于流动性引起的信贷配给，信贷产品的较差消费者被推到非正式市场。总体而言，消费者保护受到损害，因为正规部门的消费者保护规则更强，因此正式的借款机构来自构成所有市场少数律师的少数股权的正式机构。在制定信贷局和国家抵押品登记处的规则的通过，理论上，尤其是由低端借款人提供额度的信贷，但大规模的非正式市场继续复制信息不对称问题，财政政策解决结构经济的财政政策失业和文盲等问题仍有待启动，银行监管机构继续派利于精英客户，并通过政策反应来巩固太大而无法失败，但认为低端消费者也无法保存。本文得出结论，通过产权改革来征收富国和贫困之间的信贷的广泛差异，以捕捉非正式阶级的资本，促进监管，以允许电信公司（电话）和金融电信公司促进贷款集中度，刺激竞争由于他们对低端市场的卓越知识来进行贷款活动将有助于更大的访问。与消费者暴露于非正规市场中的不受管制产品导致的消费者漏洞相比，尼日利亚消费者信用的全身失败的风险是微不足道的。

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