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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of cryptographic engineering >Get your hands off my laptop: physical side-channel key-extraction attacks on PCs: Extended version
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Get your hands off my laptop: physical side-channel key-extraction attacks on PCs: Extended version

机译:将您的手从笔记本电脑上拿下来:PC上的物理侧通道密钥提取攻击:扩展版本

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摘要

We demonstrate physical side-channel attacks on a popular software implementation of RSA and ElGamal, running on laptop computers. Our attacks use novel side channels, based on the observation that the "ground" electric potential, in many computers, fluctuates in a computation-dependent way. An attacker can measure this signal by touching exposed metal on the computer's chassis with a plain wire, or even with a bare hand. The signal can also be measured on the ground shield at the remote end of Ethernet, USB and display cables. Through suitable cryptanalysis and signal processing, we have extracted 4096-bit RSA keys and 3072-bit ElGamal keys from laptops, via each of these channels, as well as via power analysis and electromagnetic probing. Despite the GHz-scale clock rate of the laptops and numerous noise sources, the full attacks require a few seconds of measurements using Medium Frequency (MF) signals (around 2 MHz), or one hour using Low Frequency (LF) signals (up to 40 kHz).
机译:我们演示了在便携式计算机上运行的RSA和ElGamal流行软件实现上的物理侧信道攻击。基于以下观察,我们的攻击使用了新颖的侧通道:在许多计算机中,“地”电势以计算相关的方式波动。攻击者可以通过用裸线甚至裸手触摸计算机机箱上裸露的金属来测量此信号。还可以在以太网,USB和显示电缆的远端的接地屏蔽层上测量信号。通过适当的密码分析和信号处理,我们通过这些通道中的每个通道,以及通过功率分析和电磁探测,从笔记本电脑中提取了4096位RSA密钥和3072位ElGamal密钥。尽管笔记本电脑的时钟频率为GHz级,并且存在众多噪声源,但使用中频(MF)信号(大约2 MHz)进行全面攻击需要几秒钟的测量时间,而使用低频(LF)信号(直到2GHz)则需要进行一小时的测量40 kHz)。

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