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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control >Do inflation-targeting central banks adjust inflation targets to meet the target?
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Do inflation-targeting central banks adjust inflation targets to meet the target?

机译：以通胀为目标的中央银行是否会调整通胀目标以实现目标？

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摘要

Under inflation targeting, central banks are supposed to set an inflation target in advance and then try to make the actual inflation reach the target. However, central banks may have an incentive to adjust their targets to meet their goals. Panel data analysis with a sample of 19 inflation-targeting countries show that changes in the inflation target significantly and positively respond to the deviation of the inflation rate from the target in the previous period. This result supports the idea that inflation-targeting central banks adjust the inflation target to meet the target when they miss it. Further analysis suggests that such a relationship is more evident in central banks with low credibility or weak performance compared with high credibility or strong performance. Finally, we show that such behavior of central banks can lead to equilibrium indeterminacy in the standard New Keynesian model. Further, such behavior renders achieving equilibrium determinacy harder for central banks even in more realistic models. This result may imply that when central banks respond to missed inflation targets by adjusting their targets and to enhance the credibility and stabilize the inflation rate, they may end up destabilizing inflation expectations and the inflation rate. (C) 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机译：在通胀目标下，中央银行应该事先设定一个通胀目标，然后设法使实际通胀达到目标。但是，中央银行可能有动力调整其目标以实现其目标。通过对19个通货膨胀目标国家的抽样进行的面板数据分析表明，通货膨胀目标的变化对上一时期通货膨胀率与目标的偏离产生了显着积极的反应。该结果支持以下观点：以通胀为目标的中央银行在错过目标时会调整通胀目标以实现目标。进一步的分析表明，与信誉度高或绩效强的中央银行相比，这种关系在中央银行中更为明显。最后，我们证明了中央银行的这种行为可以导致标准新凯恩斯模型中的均衡不确定性。此外，即使在更现实的模型中，这种行为也使得中央银行更难实现均衡确定性。该结果可能意味着，当央行通过调整目标并提高信用度并稳定通胀率来应对未实现的通胀目标时，它们最终可能会破坏稳定的通胀预期和通胀率。 （C）2020 Elsevier B.V.保留所有权利。

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