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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control >Monopoly, unilateral climate policies and limit pricing
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Monopoly, unilateral climate policies and limit pricing

机译：垄断，单方面的气候政策和限制定价

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We examine the behavior of a fossil fuel monopolist who faces demand from two regions: a 'climate club' and the 'rest of the world' (ROW). Each region is able to produce a per-fect substitute for fossil energy at constant marginal costs. The climate club uses a carbon tax and a renewables subsidy as policy instruments. The ROW is policy-inactive. We fully characterize the market equilibrium and show that, due to differences in climate policies between the climate club and the ROW, the monopolistic fossil fuel supplier may choose for two limit-pricing phases to postpone entry of renewables producers: First in the climate club and later in the ROW. As soon as energy demand from the climate club shifts from fossil fuels to renewables, the monopolist abruptly increases the fossil price for the ROW. (c) 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ )
机译：我们研究了一部分从两个地区所需的化石燃料垄断者的行为：一个“气候俱乐部”和“世界其他地区”（行）。每个地区能够以恒定的边际成本产生对化石能量的每种替代品。气候俱乐部使用碳税和可再生能源补贴作为政策工具。该行是策略无效的。我们完全表征了市场均衡，表明，由于气候俱乐部和行之间的气候政策差异，垄断化石燃料供应商可以选择两个限制定价阶段，推迟再生能源生产商：首先在气候俱乐部和后来的行。一旦气候俱乐部的能源需求从化石燃料转移到可再生能源，垄断者突然提高了该行的化石价格。 （c）2020提交人。由elsevier b.v发布。这是CC下的开放式访问文章（http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/）

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