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Wage negotiations in multi-worker firms and stochastic bargaining powers of existing workers

机译:多员公司的工资谈判以及现有工人的随机议价权力

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This study develops a business cycle search and matching model in which the volatility of employment closely matches that of the U.S. data without wage rigidity and the labor share overshoots in response to productivity shocks. To this end, I introduce an alternative mechanism of wage negotiations and bargaining shocks in an environment wherein a firm hires more than one worker and faces diminishing marginal product of labor (MPL). When Nash bargaining with a marginal worker breaks down, a firm negotiates wages with existing workers and produces with them. The breakdown in the negotiation with the marginal worker negatively affects the bargaining position of the firm with existing workers (one fewer workers) due to diminishing MPL because MPL is higher with one fewer workers. How much the firm internalizes this negative effect depends on the stochastic bargaining powers of existing workers, which can be identified through labor share data. The stochastic bargaining power of existing workers provides an additional margin to increase the volatility of labor market variables, including wages. (C) 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机译:本研究开发了一个商业周期搜索和匹配模型,其中就业的波动性与未经工资刚度的无波动性密切匹配,劳动力份额以响应生产力冲击而过度。为此,我在一个环境中介绍了工资谈判和讨价还价冲击的替代机制,其中坚定雇用多个工人并面临劳动边际产品(MPL)的边际产品。当纳什与边缘工人讨价还价崩溃时,一家公司与现有工人谈判工资并与他们产生。由于MPL减少,利用MPL递减,利用MPL递减,利用现有工人(一名工人)的谈判地位,由于MPL更高,因此讨论了与现有工人(一名工人)的讨价还价。该公司内化了多少消极效果取决于现有工人的随机议价权力,可以通过劳动股权确定。现有工人的随机讨价还价能力提供了额外的余量,以增加劳动力市场变量的波动,包括​​工资。 (c)2020 Elsevier B.v.保留所有权利。

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