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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control >A stochastic differential game of duopolistic competition with sticky prices
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A stochastic differential game of duopolistic competition with sticky prices

机译：粘滞价格的多级竞争随机差异游戏

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摘要

In this paper, we present a stochastic differential game model of duopolistic competition with sticky prices, which extends the model analyzed in the seminal paper by Fershtman and Kamien (1987), and derive analytically a feedback Nash equilibrium of the game. Uncertainty is modelled by means of a Wiener process affecting the evolution of the price. We show that the expected price converges to a level that can be either higher or lower than the deterministic stationary price, depending on market size. We also show that uncertainty is beneficial to firms in terms of long-run expected profits and may be beneficial to firms in terms of discounted expected profits, depending on market size as well. Furthermore, we show that the long-run stationary probability density of the market price can be computed explicitly. (C) 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机译：在本文中，我们展示了一种具有粘性价格的多级垄断竞争的随机差异游戏模型，其通过Fershtman和Kamien（1987）在精细纸上分析的模型，并通过分析达到了游戏的反馈纳入均衡。不确定性是通过影响价格演变的维纳过程建模的。我们认为，预期价格会聚到一个水平，这些水平可以更高或低于确定性的固定价格，具体取决于市场规模。我们还表明，在长期预期利润方面，不确定性对企业有益，并且可能对公司的折扣预期利润有益，具体取决于市场规模。此外，我们表明，可以明确计算市场价格的长期固定概率密度。 （c）2020 Elsevier B.v.保留所有权利。

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