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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control >The value of monetary policy commitment under imperfect fiscal credibility
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The value of monetary policy commitment under imperfect fiscal credibility

机译：财政信誉不完善下货币政策承诺的价值

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摘要

A central finding of the previous monetary policy research is that commitment to a policy rule results in substantial welfare gains. In this paper, I reevaluate the value of monetary policy commitment in an environment where monetary and fiscal policies are conducted by separate branches of the government. I find that welfare gains from monetary policy commitment can be small if the fiscal authority can exercise a certain degree of commitment on his own. I also find that a moderate improvement in fiscal credibility can substantially reduce the welfare gains from full commitment in monetary policy under monetary leadership. Under fiscal leadership, the degree of fiscal credibility does not affect the welfare gains from monetary commitment.
机译：先前货币政策研究的一个主要发现是，对政策规则的承诺会带来可观的福利收益。在本文中，我将重新评估在货币和财政政策由政府独立部门执行的环境中的货币政策承诺的价值。我发现，如果财政当局可以自己行使一定程度的承诺，那么从货币政策承诺中获得的福利收益就很小。我还发现，适度提高财政信誉可以大大减少在货币领导下对货币政策的充分承诺带来的福利收益。在财政领导下，财政信誉度不会影响货币承诺带来的福利收益。

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