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Optimal stalling when bargaining

机译：讨价还价时的最佳停顿

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摘要

This paper analyzes an alternating offer model of bargaining over the sale of an asset in a market, such as that for housing, in which another agent may come and compete for the right to strike a deal. The analysis allows the buyer and seller to have possibly differing views as to how likely such a competition is. Hence the buyer and the seller disagree about their respective bargaining powers. These views adjust to market realizations as the parties learn. It is shown that there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium which can be explicitly constructed: hence, conditional on market conditions, equilibrium prices and optimal stall lengths (that is, delay) can be found. Bargaining delay can only occur if there is optimism (not pessimism) and only if the parties are open to learning as time elapses. This delay can occur even for very small levels of optimism and the delay can be for economically significant periods.
机译：本文分析了一种在市场（如房屋市场）上出售资产进行讨价还价的交替报价模型，在该模型中，另一位代理人可能会竞相竞争达成交易的权利。该分析使买卖双方对这种竞争的可能性有不同的看法。因此，买卖双方在各自的议价能力上存在分歧。当各方学习时，这些观点将适应市场实现。结果表明，存在一个可以明确构建的独特的子博弈完美均衡：因此，可以根据市场条件，均衡价格和最优停滞时间（即延迟）来确定条件。谈判延迟只能在有乐观（不是悲观）的情况下发生，并且只有当各方愿意随着时间的流逝而学习时，谈判才会出现。即使是非常小的乐观水平，也会发生这种延迟，并且这种延迟可能会发生在经济上很重要的时期。

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