• 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control >Optimal monetary policy with imperfect unemployment insurance
【24h】

Optimal monetary policy with imperfect unemployment insurance

机译：失业保险不完善的最优货币政策

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

We consider an efficiency-wage model with the Calvo-type sticky prices and analyze the optimal monetary policy when the unemployment insurance is not perfect. With imperfect risk sharing, the strict zero-inflation policy is no longer optimal even when the zero-inflation steady-state equilibrium is made (conditionally) efficient. Quantitative results depend on how the idiosyncratic earning loss due to unemployment varies over business cycles. If the idiosyncratic income loss is acyclical, the optimal policy differs very little from the zero-inflation policy. However, if it varies countercyclically, as evidence suggests, the deviation of the optimal policy from the complete price-level stabilization becomes quantitatively significant. Furthermore, the optimal policy in such a case involves stabilization of output to a much larger extent.
机译：我们考虑了具有卡尔沃型粘性价格的效率工资模型，并分析了失业保险不完善时的最优货币政策。由于风险分担不完善，即使使零通胀稳态平衡（有条件）有效，严格的零通胀政策也不再是最优的。定量结果取决于失业导致的特有收入损失在整个商业周期中如何变化。如果特殊收入损失是非周期性的，则最优政策与零通胀政策的差异很小。但是，如证据所示，如果逆周期变化，则最优政策与完全价格水平稳定的偏差在数量上会变得很重要。此外，在这种情况下的最优政策涉及更大程度地稳定输出。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号