An adverse selection model of optimal unemployment insurance

Marcus Hagedorn; Ashok Kaul; Tim Mennel

首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control >An adverse selection model of optimal unemployment insurance

【24h】

An adverse selection model of optimal unemployment insurance

机译：最优失业保险的逆向选择模型

获取原文

获取原文并翻译 | 示例

掌桥外文数据库（机构版） >>

开具论文收录证明 >>

文献代查 >>

页面导航

摘要
著录项
相似文献
相关主题

摘要

We ask whether offering a menu of unemployment insurance contracts is welfare-improving in a heterogeneous population. We adopt a repeated moral hazard framework as in Shavell and Weiss (1979), supplemented by unobserved heterogeneity about agents' job opportunities. Our main theoretical contribution is a quasi-recursive formulation of our adverse selection problem, including a geometric characterization of the state space. Our main economic result is that optimal contracts for "bad" searchers tend to be upward-sloping due to an adverse selection effect. This is in contrast to the well-known optimal decreasing time profile of benefits in pure moral hazard environments that continue to be optimal for "good" searchers in our model.

机译：我们询问提供一份失业保险合同菜单是否在异类人群中改善了福利。我们采用了Shavell和Weiss（1979）反复提出的道德风险框架，并辅之以关于代理人工作机会的未观察到的异质性。我们的主要理论贡献是对逆向选择问题的准递归公式化，包括状态空间的几何表征。我们的主要经济结果是，由于不利的选择效应，“不良”搜索者的最优合同倾向于向上倾斜。这与众所周知的纯道德风险环境中收益的最佳减少时间曲线相反，后者在我们的模型中对于“好”搜索者仍然是最佳的。

著录项

来源
《Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control》 |2010年第3期|490-502|共13页
作者
Marcus Hagedorn; Ashok Kaul; Tim Mennel;
展开▼
作者单位

Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (IEW). University of Zurich, Muehlebachstrasse 86, CH-8008 Zurich, Switzerland;

Saarland University, Campus C3 1, D-66123 Saarbrucken, Germany IEW, University of Zurich, Switzerland;

Zentrum fuer Europaeische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW), Postfach W3443, D-68034 Mannheim, Germany;

展开▼
收录信息
原文格式 PDF
正文语种 eng
中图分类
关键词
unemployment insurance; recursive contracts; adverse selection; repeated moral hazard;

机译：失业保险;递归合同;逆向选择;反复的道德风险;

相似文献

外文文献
中文文献
专利

1. Adverse selection and moral hazard: Quantitative implications for unemployment insurance [J] . David L. Fuller Journal of Monetary Economics . 2014,第mara期

机译：不良选择和道德风险：对失业保险的定量影响
2. (Neutrally) Optimal Mechanism under Adverse Selection: The canonical insurance problem [J] . Diasakos Theodoros M., Koufopoulos Kostas Games and economic behavior . 2018,第期

机译：（中性）在不利选择下的最佳机制：规范保险问题
3. Optimal insurance under adverse selection and ambiguity aversion [J] . Kostas Koufopoulos, Roman Kozhan Economic Theory . 2016,第4期

机译：逆向选择和歧义规避下的最优保险
4. Advantageous Selection versus Adverse Selection in Life Insurance Market [C] . Ghadir Mahdavi 2006 China International Conference in Finance (CICF 2006) . 2006

机译：人寿保险市场中的优势选择与不利选择
5. Unemployment insurance with adverse selection. [D] . Fuller, David Lee. 2008

机译：逆向选择的失业保险。
6. Predictors of Health Insurance Enrollment among HIV Positive Pregnant Women in Kenya: Potential for Adverse Selection and Implications for HIV Treatment and Prevention [O] . Lawrence P.O. Were, Joseph W Hogan, Omar Galárraga, 2020

机译：肯尼亚艾滋病毒阳性孕妇中参加健康保险的人数预测因素：不良选择的潜力以及对艾滋病治疗和预防的影响
7. An adverse selection model of optimal unemployment insurance [O] . Hagedorn, M, Kaul, A, Mennel, T 2010

机译：最优失业保险的逆向选择模型

An adverse selection model of optimal unemployment insurance

摘要

著录项

相似文献

相关主题

期刊订阅