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Contract adjustment under uncertainty

机译:不确定条件下的合同调整

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Consider trade in continuous time between two players. The gains from trade are divided according to a contract, and at each point in time, either player may unilaterally induce a costly adjustment of the contract. Players' payoffs from trade under the contract, as well as from trade under an adjusted contract, are exogenous and stochastic. We consider players' choice of whether and when to adjust the contract payment. We show that there exists a Nash equilibrium in thresholds, where each player adjusts the contract whenever the contract payment relative to the outcome of an adjustment passes the threshold. There is strategic substitutability in the choice of thresholds, so that if one player becomes more active by choosing a threshold closer to unity, the other player becomes more passive.
机译:考虑两个参与者之间连续时间的交易。贸易收益根据合同进行分配,并且在每个时间点,任何参与者都可以单方面诱使合同进行昂贵的调整。参与者从合同下的交易以及调整后的合同下的交易中获得的收益是外生的和随机的。我们考虑玩家选择是否以及何时调整合同付款。我们证明了阈值中存在纳什均衡,即每当参与者相对于调整结果的合同付款超过阈值时,每个参与者都会调整合同。阈值的选择具有战略上的可替代性,因此,如果一个参与者通过选择一个更接近统一的阈值而变得更加主动,则另一参与者变得更加被动。

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