• 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control >Is corporate control effective when managers face investment timing decisions in incomplete markets?
【24h】

Is corporate control effective when managers face investment timing decisions in incomplete markets?

机译：当经理在不完整的市场中面对投资时机决策时，公司控制是否有效？

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

This paper presents a model of investment timing by risk averse managers facing incomplete markets and corporate control. Managers are exposed to idiosyncratic risks due to the dependence of their compensation on investment payoffs which are not spanned by other assets. We show that risk averse managers invest earlier than well-diversified shareholders would prefer, leading to significant agency costs. This effect can be mitigated if the manager is subject to corporate control. Our main finding is that the interaction of idiosyncratic risk and control results in two regimes. When the market is sufficiently close to being complete, control has a strong disciplinary effect and agency costs can be virtually eliminated. However, when idiosyncratic risk is too large, shareholders suffer agency costs and control is ineffective. An implication is that we would expect to see different investment behavior across industries or specific investments as the degree of idiosyncratic risk varied. It would also suggest that both the standard complete-markets real options model and the npv framework can proxy in describing investment timing.
机译：本文提出了一个风险厌恶经理面对不完整的市场和公司控制的投资时机模型。经理由于其报酬依赖于投资收益的风险而遭受特殊风险，而其他资产并未涵盖这些收益。我们证明，规避风险的经理人的投资要早于多元化股东的投资意愿，从而导致大量的代理费用。如果经理受公司控制，则可以减轻这种影响。我们的主要发现是，特质风险和控制的相互作用导致了两种机制。当市场足够接近完成时，控制将具有很强的纪律作用，并且代理成本实际上可以被消除。但是，当特质风险太大时，股东会承受代理费用，控制也就无效。暗示是，随着特质风险程度的变化，我们期望跨行业或特定投资看到不同的投资行为。这也意味着标准的完整市场实物期权模型和npv框架都可以用来描述投资时机。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号