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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control >Learning by doing vs. learning from others in a principal-agent model
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Learning by doing vs. learning from others in a principal-agent model

机译:边做边学与在代理人模型中向他人学习

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摘要

We introduce learning in a principal-agent model of output sharing under moral hazard. We use social evolutionary learning to represent social learning and reinforcement, experience-weighted attraction (EWA) and individual evolutionary learning (IEL) to represent individual learning. Learning in the principal-agent model is difficult due to: the stochastic environment; the discontinuity in payoffs at the optimal contract; and the incorrect evaluation of foregone payoffs for IEL and EWA. Social learning is much more successful in adapting to the optimal contract than standard individual learning algorithms. A modified IEL using realized payoffs evaluation performs better but still falls short of social learning.
机译:我们将学习引入道德风险下产出共享的委托-代理模型中。我们使用社会进化学习来表示社会学习和强化,经验加权吸引力(EWA)和个体进化学习(IEL)来表示个体学习。由于以下原因,在委托代理模型中学习很困难:最优合同的收益不连续性;对IEL和EWA放弃的收益的错误评估。社会学习在适应最佳合同方面比标准的个人学习算法成功得多。使用已实现的收益评估的改良IEL表现更好,但仍缺乏社会学习能力。

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