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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Economic Literature >Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment, and Growth
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Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment, and Growth

机译：公司治理，经济发展与增长

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Outside the United States and the United Kingdom, large corporations usually have controlling owners, who are usually very wealthy families. Pyramidal control structures, cross shareholding, and super-voting rights let such families control corporations without making a commensurate capital investment. In many countries, a few such families end up controlling considerable proportions of their countries' economies. Three points emerge. First, at the firm level, these ownership structures, because they vest dominant control rights with families who often have little real capital invested, permit a range of agency problems and hence resource misallocation. If a few families control large swaths of an economy, such corporate governance problems can attain macroeconomic importance-affecting rates of innovation, economywide resource allocation, and economic growth. If political influence depends on what one controls, rather than what one owns, the controlling owners of pyramids have greatly amplified political influence relative to their actual wealth. This influence can distort public policy regarding property rights protection, capital markets, and other institutions. We denote this phenomenon economic entrenchment, and posit a relationship between the distribution of corporate control and institutional development that generates and preserves economic entrenchment as one possible equilibrium. The literature suggests key determinants of economic entrenchment, but has many gaps where further work exploring the political economy importance of the distribution of corporate control is needed.
机译：在美国和英国以外，大型公司通常拥有控股所有者，他们通常是非常富有的家庭。金字塔形的控制结构，交叉持股和超级表决权使此类家庭无需进行相应的资本投资即可控制公司。在许多国家，少数这样的家庭最终控制了其国家相当大的经济。三点出现。首先，在公司一级，这些所有权结构由于拥有通常没有多少实际资本投入的家庭的支配控制权，因此会导致一系列代理问题，从而导致资源分配不当。如果少数家庭控制着一大片经济，那么这种公司治理问题就可以达到宏观经济重要性，从而影响创新率，整个经济范围内的资源分配和经济增长。如果政治影响力取决于一个人的控制权，而不是一个人的财产，那么金字塔的控制权所有者会相对于其实际财富极大地扩大政治影响力。这种影响会扭曲有关财产权保护，资本市场和其他机构的公共政策。我们将这种现象表示为经济根深蒂固，并且在公司控制权的分布与制度发展之间建立了一种关系，这种关系产生并保留了经济根深蒂固，作为一种可能的平衡。文献提出了经济纠缠的关键决定因素，但仍有许多空白需要进一步研究探索公司控制权分配的政治经济学重要性。

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