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Public goods with ambiguity in large economies

机译:大型经济体中的公共物品含糊不清

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We consider a canonical problem in economics: the financing and provision of a public good. Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) show that under natural information and enforcement frictions, the probability of providing the public good falls to zero as the population size goes to infinity even if provision of the public good is efficient. In this paper, we allow agents to have multiple prior beliefs about others' valuations and to make choices that reflect their aversion to that ambiguity. We show that, as long as each agent's set of priors contains some distribution of valuations under which provision is inefficient, it is possible to find a mechanism in large economies that finances provision of the public good. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
机译:我们考虑经济学中的一个规范问题:公共物品的融资和提供。 Mailath和Postlewaite(1990)表明,在自然信息和执行摩擦的情况下,即使提供公共物品的效率很高,随着人口规模达到无穷大,提供公共物品的可能性也将降至零。在本文中,我们允许代理商对他人的估值具有多种先验信念,并做出反映他们对这种歧义的厌恶的选择。我们表明,只要每个代理人的先验条件集包含一定的估值分布,在这种分配下效率低下的准备金,就有可能在大型经济体中找到一种机制来为公共物品的供应提供资金。 (C)2019 Elsevier Inc.保留所有权利。

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