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Constrained efficiency with adverse selection and directed search

机译：逆向选择和定向搜索的效率受到限制

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This paper studies constrained efficiency in Guerrieri et al.'s (2010) model of adverse selection and directed search. Buyers post contracts, and sellers with private information about their type direct their search toward their preferred contract. Buyers and sellers then match bilaterally and trade. If the Guerrieri-Shimer-Wright equilibrium fails to achieve the first best, then the planner subject to the frictions of the environment achieves strictly higher welfare than the equilibrium, i.e., the equilibrium is not ex-ante constrained efficient. Under certain conditions, the planner achieves an allocation that even Pareto dominates the equilibrium, i.e., the equilibrium is not interim constrained efficient. Under other conditions, the planner can completely undo the effects of adverse selection and achieves the first best. Cross-subsidization is the key to these results. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
机译：本文研究了Guerrieri et al。（2010）的逆向选择和定向搜索模型中的约束效率。买家发布合同，而卖家拥有有关其类型的私人信息，则将搜索指向他们首选的合同。然后买卖双方进行双边贸易。如果Guerrieri-Shimer-Wright平衡未能达到最佳状态，那么受环境摩擦影响的规划师将获得比平衡严格更高的福利，即，该平衡不是事前约束的效率。在某些条件下，计划者可以实现一种分配，即使帕累托也能支配均衡，即均衡不是临时约束有效的。在其他条件下，计划者可以完全消除逆向选择的影响，并达到最佳效果。交叉补贴是这些结果的关键。 （C）2019 Elsevier Inc.保留所有权利。

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