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The impact of access to consumer data on the competitive effects of horizontal mergers and exclusive dealing

机译：访问消费者数据对横向合并和独家交易的竞争影响

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摘要

We examine the influence of firms' ability to employ individualized pricing on the welfare consequences of horizontal mergers. In a two-to-one merger, the merger reduces consumer surplus more when firms can price discriminate based on individual preferences compared to when they cannot. However, the opposite holds true in a three-to-two merger, in which the reduction in consumer surplus is substantially lower with individualized pricing than with uniform pricing. Further, the merger requires an even smaller marginal cost reduction to justify when an upstream data provider can make exclusive offers for its data to downstream firms. We also show that exclusive contracts for consumer data pose significant antitrust concerns independent of merger considerations. Implications for vertical integration and data mergers are drawn.
机译：我们研究了企业采用个性化定价的能力对横向兼并的福利后果的影响。在二对一合并中，与不能合并的企业相比，当企业可以基于个人偏好进行价格区分时，合并可以减少更多的消费者剩余。但是，在三对二合并中，情况恰恰相反，在这种合并中，采用个性化定价的消费者剩余减少量要比采用统一定价的消费者剩余减少量要低得多。此外，合并还需要减少较小的边际成本，以证明上游数据提供商何时可以向下游公司独家提供其数据。我们还表明，与合并注意事项无关，用于消费者数据的专有合同构成了重大的反托拉斯关注。得出了垂直集成和数据合并的含义。

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