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Equilibrium Principal-Agent Contracts: Competition and R&D incentives

机译：均衡的委托代理合同：竞争和研发激励

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摘要

We analyze competition between firms engaged in R&D activities and market competition to study the choice of the incentive contracts for managers with hidden productivity. Oligopolistic screening requires extra effort/investment from the most productive managers: under additional assumptions on the hazard rate of the distribution of types we obtain no distortion in the middle rather than at the top. The equilibrium contracts are characterized by effort differentials between (any) two types always increasing with the number of firms, suggesting a positive relation between competition and high-powered incentives. An inverted U curve between competition and absolute investments can emerge for the most productive managers.
机译：我们分析了从事研发活动的公司与市场竞争之间的竞争，以研究具有隐性生产率的经理人的激励合同的选择。寡头筛查需要最有生产力的管理者付出额外的努力/投入：在对类型分布的危害率进行额外假设的情况下，我们不会在中间而不是在顶部获得失真。均衡合同的特征是（任意）两种类型之间的努力差异总是随公司数量的增加而增加，这表明竞争与高能动力之间存在正相关关系。对于生产率最高的经理人来说，竞争和绝对投资之间会出现倒U曲线。

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