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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Economics & Management Strategy >Information or Opinion? Media Bias as Product Differentiation
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Information or Opinion? Media Bias as Product Differentiation

机译：信息还是意见？媒体偏好与产品差异化

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摘要

Two aspects of media bias are important empirically. First, bias is persistent: it does not seem to disappear even when the media is under scrutiny. Second, bias is conflicting: different people often perceive bias in the same media outlet to be of opposite signs. We build a model in which both empirical characteristics of bias are observed in equilibrium. The key assumptions are that the information contained in the facts about a news event may not always be fully verifiable, and consumers have heterogeneous prior views ("ideologies") about the news event. Based on these ingredients of the model, we build a location model with entry to characterize firms' reports in equilibrium, and the nature of bias. When a news item comprises only fully verifiable facts, firms report these as such, so that there is no bias and the market looks like any market for information. When a news item comprises information that is mostly nonverifiable, however, then consumers may care both about opinion and editorials, and a firm's report will contain both these aspects—in which case the market resembles any differentiated product market. Thus, the appearance of bias is a result of equilibrium product differentiation when some facts are nonverifiable. We use the model to address several questions, including the impact of competition on bias, the incentives to report unpopular news, and the impact of owner ideology We are grateful to the editors and two referees for their suggestions. For helpful conversations we thank Roni Fischer, Ariel Pakes, Julio Rotemberg, and Andrei Shleifer. Anand and Di Telia gratefully acknowledge the financial support from the Division of Research at Harvard Business School, and Galetovic the hospitality of the Stanford Center for International Development. on bias. In general, competition does not lead to a reduction in bias unless this is accompanied by an increase in verifiability or a smaller dispersion of prior beliefs.
机译：媒体偏见的两个方面在经验上很重要。首先，偏见是持久的：即使在媒体审查之下，偏见似乎也不会消失。第二，偏见是相互矛盾的：不同的人经常将同一媒体的偏见视为相反的迹象。我们建立了一个模型，在该模型中，在均衡状态下都观察到偏差的两个经验特性。关键的假设是，新闻事件的事实中包含的信息可能并不总是可以完全验证的，并且消费者对新闻事件的先验视图（“意识形态”）具有不同的观点。基于模型的这些要素，我们建立了带有位置的位置模型，以刻画企业报告处于均衡状态和偏倚的性质。当新闻只包含完全可核实的事实时，公司会这样报道，这样就不会产生偏差，市场就像任何信息市场一样。但是，当新闻中包含几乎无法验证的信息时，消费者可能会同时关注意见和社论，并且公司的报告将同时包含这两个方面，在这种情况下，市场类似于任何差异化的产品市场。因此，当某些事实不可验证时，出现偏差是平衡产品差异的结果。我们使用该模型解决了几个问题，包括竞争对偏见的影响，举报不受欢迎新闻的动机以及所有者意识形态的影响。我们感谢编辑和两位裁判的建议。对于有益的对话，我们感谢Roni Fischer，Ariel Pakes，Julio Rotemberg和Andrei Shleifer。 Anand和Di Telia非常感谢哈佛商学院研究部的财政支持，Galetovic感谢斯坦福大学国际发展中心的接待。偏见。通常，除非伴随着可验证性的提高或先前信念的较小分散，否则竞争不会导致偏差的减少。

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