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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis >The Performance of Investment Bank-Affiliated Mutual Funds: Conflicts of Interest or Informational Advantage?
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The Performance of Investment Bank-Affiliated Mutual Funds: Conflicts of Interest or Informational Advantage?

机译：投资银行附属共同基金的业绩：利益冲突还是信息优势？

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摘要

Using a comprehensive sample of U.S. mutual funds from 1992 to 2004, we find strong evidence that investment bank-affiliated funds underperform unaffiliated funds. Consistent with the conflict of interest hypothesis, we find that affiliated funds hold disproportionately large amounts of stocks of their initial public offering and seasoned equity offering clients. Moreover, worse-performing clients are more likely to be held by affiliated funds. Our results are robust to alternative risk adjustments, portfolio weighting schemes, and regression methodologies. Overall, our findings are consistent with the idea that investment banks use affiliated funds to support underwriting business at the expense of fund shareholders.
机译：使用1992年至2004年美国共同基金的全面样本，我们发现有力的证据表明，投资银行附属基金的表现要优于非附属基金。与利益冲突假设一致，我们发现附属基金持有的首次公开发行股票和经验丰富的股票发行客户的股票数量不成比例。此外，表现较差的客户更有可能被附属基金持有。我们的结果对于替代性风险调整，投资组合加权方案和回归方法具有鲁棒性。总体而言，我们的发现与投资银行使用附属基金来支持承销业务而损害了基金股东的想法是一致的。

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